

# Daniil Larionov

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## Academic employment

- Postdoctoral researcher, 2022 - present, *ZEW Mannheim*
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## Education

- PhD in Economics, 2022, *University of Mannheim*
  - MSc in Economics, 2017, *University of Mannheim*
  - BSc in Economics, 2014, *Saint Petersburg University*
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## References

**Thomas Tröger**  
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## Research fields

- Microeconomics, Industrial Organization, Market Design
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## Working papers

- **Full Surplus Extraction from Colluding Bidders (Job Market Paper)**

I consider a repeated auction setting with colluding buyers and a seller who adjusts reserve prices over time without long-term commitment. To model the seller's concern for collusion, I introduce a new equilibrium concept: *collusive public perfect equilibrium*. For every strategy of the seller I define the corresponding “*buyer-game*” in which the seller is replaced by Nature who chooses the reserve prices for the buyers in accordance with the seller's strategy. A public perfect equilibrium is collusive if the buyers cannot achieve a higher symmetric public perfect equilibrium payoff in the corresponding buyer-game. In a setting with symmetric buyers with private binary *iid* valuations and publicly revealed bids, I find *collusive public perfect equilibria* that allow the seller to extract the entire surplus from the buyers in the limit as the buyers' discount factor goes to 1. I therefore show that a non-committed seller can effectively fight collusion even when she faces patient buyers, can only set reserve prices, and has to satisfy stringent public disclosure requirements.

- **First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition**

*with Hien Pham, Takuro Yamashita, and Shuguang Zhu*

We study mechanism design with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a principal and four or more agents, sharing a common prior over a set of payoff-relevant states. The principal proposes a mechanism to the agents who can then acquire information about the state by privately designing a signal device. As long as it is costless for each agent to acquire a signal that is independent from the state, there exists a mechanism which allows the principal to implement any social choice rule at zero information acquisition cost to the agents.

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## Work in progress

- **Bilateral Trade with Costly Information Acquisition**

*with Takuro Yamashita*

We study a bilateral trade problem with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a buyer and a seller who can trade a single unit of a good through an intermediary who designs a mechanism to facilitate their trade. In the beginning, the buyer, the seller and the intermediary share a common prior over a finite set of states of the world. The intermediary proposes a mechanism to the players, who can then acquire information about the state of the world by privately designing a signal device. Assuming that the information acquisition cost is proportional to the expected reduction in entropy, we characterize the set of implementable allocations. Using the implementability conditions, given by a finite-dimensional system of equations and inequalities, we maximize the intermediary's revenue over all implementable and allocationally efficient mech-

anisms. Under certain symmetry conditions, our revenue maximization problem can be solved in closed form.

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## Conferences and invited talks

- 2023: European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society (scheduled), Fifth Economics of Public Procurement Workshop, Annual Conference of the Society for Operations Research in Germany (OR 2023), MaCCI Annual Conference
  - 2022: Duke's Fuqua School of Business
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## Organization of workshops and conferences

- Co-organizer of the [2023 European Workshop on Market Design](#)
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## Teaching (TA) - University of Mannheim

### PhD level

- Advanced Microeconomics III  
*Spring 2021, Spring 2020, Spring 2019*
- Advanced Microeconomics I  
*Fall 2017*

### Master's level

- Advanced Microeconomics  
*Fall 2021, Fall 2020*
- Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies  
*Spring 2022, Spring 2021, Spring 2020, Spring 2019, Spring 2018*

### Bachelor's level

- Game Theory  
*Spring 2021*
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November 8, 2023